Politicians should be treated analytically as ordinary people subject to the same incentives as everyone else, rather than being romanticized as benevolent voices of the people; they respond to incentives—especially the need to get reelected—just as economic theory predicts.

The public interest theory of regulation—that we elect good people who do their best to serve the public—does not predict outcomes as reliably as other theories, because elected officials are human beings who need reelection and are therefore sensitive to private interests including their own.

Stigler's economic theory of regulation can be understood through a thought experiment: imagine auctioning a political decision off to the highest bidder on the steps of the capitol, which forces you to identify who has a stake in a regulation and who would lobby for it.

The Bootleggers and Baptists theory holds that durable regulation arises from an implicit coalition between an economic interest group that profits from the rule ('bootleggers') and a moralizing group that provides altruistic cover ('Baptists'), exemplified by Sunday liquor bans where Baptists lobby for closure and bootleggers gain a one-day-a-week illegal market—without the two ever needing to coordinate.

In the Bootleggers and Baptists model, the bootlegger is motivated by narrow economic self-interest while the Baptist takes the moral high ground, providing the politician both external moral cover and internal conscience relief so that political contributions from bootleggers can be rationalized as serving the altruistic public interest.

Early 18th-century English factory regulations restricting child labor in textile mills were promoted by a committee whose leaders owned mills using the latest labor-saving technology; by taking the moral high ground on humane working conditions, they raised their labor-intensive competitors' costs.

Early 1900s state pure-food and meat-safety laws were initially lobbied for by small local meat packers who could not compete with major Chicago packers enabled by refrigerated rail cars; the quality-control argument that refrigerated meat was unreliable had enough theoretical validity to win the day, and later drove the major packers to seek a single uniform federal regulation tailored to maximize their profits and exclude regional competitors and South American imports.

Regulation can produce a 'regulatory U-turn' where a rule passed in the name of a goal (e.g., clean air) produces the opposite outcome at higher cost: the 1970s Clean Air Act amendments mandating scrubbers on new coal plants led utilities, indifferent to coal type once a scrubber was required, to keep burning cheap dirty Eastern coal, so some pollution still escaped while costs soared—whereas using clean Western coal would have produced cleaner air without expensive scrubbers.

The scrubber mandate's bootlegger coalition included multiple parties: Eastern dirty-coal mine owners, the already-organized United Mine Workers in the East (whose jobs lasted longer than they would have otherwise), specialized coal-carrying railroads, and the scrubber manufacturers themselves.

The catalytic converter mandate ended technological competition among automakers: General Motors held the patent, and even though Honda had developed a clean-burn engine with lower emissions than a US car fitted with a catalytic converter, Honda was required to install catalytic converters to sell in the US—foreclosing superior alternatives like Chrysler's clean-burn engine.

Whenever you observe a technology-based standard rather than a performance standard, you should be highly suspicious that bootleggers are hidden behind the scenes and Baptists are working to get that specific technology specified into law.

Because of concentrated benefits and dispersed costs, technology-based standards let politicians target the delivery of a visible benefit to identifiable groups (who know they received it) while the costs are spread thinly across all consumers as small increments on power or product bills that nobody notices—whereas performance standards diffuse benefits competitively and cannot be claimed for credit.

Regulators are not neutral parties: a technology-based standard makes enforcement trivially easy (the device is either present or not), whereas a performance standard requires the regulator to measure and monitor actual outcomes—so regulators also have an incentive to prefer technology mandates.

Empirical analysis comparing smokers' shorter life expectancy and the state cigarette taxes they pay shows smokers do not impose net costs on state governments—they impose costs mainly on themselves—undermining the financial premise of the state attorneys general suits.

The 1998 tobacco Master Settlement functioned as a government-enforced cartel: the big four tobacco companies raised cigarette prices more than enough to fund the roughly $15 million per state per year cash flow, and the agreement required any new entrant to pay in on a per-cigarette basis, thereby foreclosing the competitive entry that the price increases would otherwise have induced and making the cartel 'bulletproof.'

Despite being justified as funding to reduce teenage smoking and defray healthcare costs, only about 2.5% of tobacco settlement revenue (the CDC minimum benchmark) actually goes to anti-smoking programs, while the bulk has gone to offset general state revenue shortfalls.

The tobacco settlement created winners across multiple groups beyond the companies: private plaintiff attorneys received an estimated 25% of the roughly $200 billion total (some individuals earning a billion dollars), tobacco farmers were paid off—partly by the tobacco companies—to surrender their price floors and allow them to face less international competition, and states gained general-fund revenue.

The most direct way to reduce cigarette consumption is to let the price rise, which is in fact what the settlement accomplished, yielding somewhat less smoking.

As incomes rose, states moved from a 'race to the bottom' (making conditions dirty to attract industry) to a 'race to the top' as wealthier people demanded a cleaner world, producing beneficial competition among different approaches to environmental problems.

Yandle's origin story for the theory: in 1976-77 a lawn mower manufacturer told him a proposed Consumer Product Safety Commission lawn-mower safety standard with dead-man clutches was 'the best thing' for his company because the high R&D and compliance costs would drive small mom-and-pop competitors out of business, revealing that large incumbents support costly safety regulation in good conscience.