Virginia Postrel
About
Author and prior EconTalk guest on textiles
Claims by Virginia Postrel (20 of 49)
Cited examples of 'damning' luxury consumption actually reveal pleasure-seeking, not status: the woman who bought a Viking range she rarely uses described it as 'a painting that makes the kitchen look good,' and Twitchell described the Armani store as 'like a petting zoo' because people fondle fabrics—both about sensory pleasure beyond function.
Much of what social critics assume is status competition is in fact not competition but the pursuit of new pleasures—e.g., wanting leather seats after enjoying a friend's car is about discovering a pleasure one could have, not showing up the friend; and there is no single status hierarchy.
The toilet brush is strong evidence that aesthetic spending is about personal pleasure, not status: it is a low-status, functional, rarely-seen object, yet consumers willingly pay a modest premium (and sometimes hundreds of dollars) for aesthetically pleasing holders—it is a bad way to keep up with the Joneses and therefore must be for one's own pleasure.
Some aesthetic premiums have no functional difference whatsoever: Apple charges roughly a $100 premium for the black MacBook versus the identical white one, and Motorola found it could get $30 more for green pagers than identical black ones—people will pay extra simply for a different color of the identical product.
In competitive markets, aesthetic innovations (like colored pagers or beaded shoes) cannot sustain a price premium: once one firm discovers consumers will pay more, competitors copy it, the premium is competed away, and the aesthetic gains flow entirely to consumers rather than being captured as higher prices.
Quality improvements not reflected in price distort inflation measurement: CPI counts a beaded shoe or upgraded hotel room as the same product as before, failing to capture the added quality/benefit, so price indices systematically overstate inflation—by as much as one percentage point per year—and therefore understate improvements in standard of living.
Starwood Hotels, led by a CEO from outside the industry who thought differently, reallocated fixed hotel-room budgets toward aesthetics and comfort—replacing the expensive television armoire with better mattresses, larger desks, framed mirrors, granite bathroom counters, and the all-white 'heavenly bed.'
Postwar mass markets were defined by reliability and 'no surprise' (Holiday Inn's 1975 'the best surprise is no surprise' slogan)—getting everyone to a lowest-common-denominator 'not bad'—but once that baseline is assumed, competition shifts to special experiences, personality, and aesthetic intensity, requiring greater variety because distinctive aesthetics please some and alienate others.
Adam Smith's principle that the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market explains specialization: a small-town carpenter must be a generalist to fill his time, but in 18th-century London the same worker could specialize (e.g., become a cooper); larger markets and trade enable more specialization, including specialized aesthetics.
The 20th century conflated 'large market' with 'mass market' (homogeneous, lowest-common-denominator), but technological and business developments now allow large markets that are not geographically located and can support highly specialized, niche aesthetic products—breaking that conflation (later termed serving the 'long tail').
The rise of specialty catalog sales in the early 1970s—and later internet niche markets—was enabled chiefly by two developments: computer databases and, even more importantly, credit cards (Visa/MasterCard) acting as trusted intermediaries that let small specialty sellers avoid running their own credit business while assuring buyers of recourse.
The U.S. faces a severe organ shortage that effectively kills thousands of people because of squeamishness about financial incentives for organ donation: about 70,000 Americans wait for kidneys, and even if every eligible deceased donor were used (about 15,000 kidneys/year), it would only roughly double current availability and still leave a huge waiting list—so the only way to close the gap given current technology is to encourage more live donation.
Live kidney donation is far less risky and less heroic than commonly believed: only blood-type compatibility is required (not a matching twin), a single kidney takes up the slack, and the main risks are the surgery itself plus rare cases of kidney cancer or trauma—making it comparable in risk to elective cosmetic surgeries or paid jobs like firefighting.
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